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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah from 
which this appeal arises, is based on U.C.A. 78-3-4(l)(1953, as amended). Jurisdiction to 
hear this appeal is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Article VIII, 
Section 5 of the Constitution of the State of Utah, U.C.A. 78-2-2(3)(j)(1995 Supp.) and 
Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure; this appeal was assigned to the Utah 
Court of Appeals by the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
A. Was it reversible error for the District Court to find that Res Judicata barred Nipper's/ 
Ludwigs' claims against Douglas when there was and still is no final order in the Fredericks 
Case? 
Preserved for appeal in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant John 
Douglas' Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 336-401, Plaintiffs Memorandum (1) in 
Reply to Defendant John Douglas' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, R. 402-403, Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant John 
Douglas' Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions, R. 512-521, Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support 
of His Motion for Reconsideration of Ruling on Summary Judgment as to Defendant John 
Douglas and for Award of Attorney's Fees, R. 578-589, Plaintiff's Memorandum in Reply 
to Defendant John Douglas' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of 
Ruling on Summary Judgment as to Defendant Douglas and for Award of Attorney's 
1 
Fees, R. 616-619, Objection to Proposed Order on Motion for Reconsideration, and 
Motion to Reconsider to Either Delay Dismissal Pending Motion to Consolidate or To 
Make any Dismissal Without Prejudice, R. 634-636. 
B. Was it reversible error for the District Court to find that Res Judicata barred 
Nipper5 s/Ludwigs' claims which were based upon different theories and facts (the civil 
conspiracy and RICO claims/facts), which included those that had been obtained by 
assignment from the Ludwigs? 
Preserved for appeal in Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant John 
Douglas' Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 336-401, Plaintiffs Memorandum (1) in 
Reply to Defendant John Douglas' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, R. 402-403, Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant John 
Douglas' Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions, R. 512-521, Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support 
of His Motion for Reconsideration of Ruling on Summary Judgment as to Defendant John 
Douglas and for Award of Attorney's Fees, R. 578-589, Plaintiff's Memorandum in Reply 
to Defendant John Douglas' Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration of 
Ruling on Summary Judgment as to Defendant Douglas and for Award of Attorney's 
Fees, R. 616-619, Objection to Proposed Order on Motion for Reconsideration, and 
Motion to Reconsider to Either Delay Dismissal Pending Motion to Consolidate or To 
Make any Dismissal Without Prejudice, R. 634-636. 
C. Was it reversible error for the District Court to rule that Nipper should have 
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brought claims in the Fredericks Case upon facts and claims that Nipper was totally 
unaware of at the time that he filed his complaint in the Fredericks Case? 
Preserved for appeal in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant John 
Douglas' Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 336-401, Plaintiff's Memorandum (1) in 
Reply to Defendant John Douglas' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, R. 402-403, Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant John 
Douglas' Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions, R. 512-521, Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support 
of His Motion for Reconsideration of Ruling on Summary Judgment as to Defendant John 
Douglas and for Award of Attorney's Fees, R. 578-589, Plaintiff's Memorandum in Reply 
to Defendant John Douglas' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of 
Ruling on Summary Judgment as to Defendant Douglas and for Award of Attorney's 
Fees, R. 616-619, Objection to Proposed Order on Motion for Reconsideration, and 
Motion to Reconsider to Either Delay Dismissal Pending Motion to Consolidate or To 
Make any Dismissal Without Prejudice, R. 634-636. 
D. Was it reversible error for Judge Noel not to reverse himself and consider the 
criminal guilty pleas and/or convictions of Douglas, Gent and Nichols as res judicata with 
respect to the RICO claims and conspiracy claims in this lawsuit? 
Preserved for appeal in Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant John 
Douglas' Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 336-401, Plaintiff's Memorandum (1) in 
Reply to Defendant John Douglas' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
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Judgment, R. 402-403, Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant John 
Douglas' Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions, R. 512-521, Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support 
of His Motion for Reconsideration of Ruling on Summary Judgment as to Defendant John 
Douglas and for Award of Attorney's Fees, R. 578-589, Plaintiffs Memorandum in Reply 
to Defendant John Douglas' Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration of 
Ruling on Summary Judgment as to Defendant Douglas and for Award of Attorney's 
Fees, R. 616-619, Objection to Proposed Order on Motion for Reconsideration, and 
Motion to Reconsider to Either Delay Dismissal Pending Motion to Consolidate or To 
Make any Dismissal Without Prejudice, R. 634-636. 
E. Was it Reversible error to rule that plaintiffs claims against Douglas should 
be dismissed with prejudice, when the Fredericks Case is still open and the claims could 
still be brought in that case? 
Preserved for Appeal in Objection to Proposed Order on Motion for 
Reconsideration, and Motion to Reconsider to Either Delay Dismissal Pending Motion to 
Consolidate or To Make any Dismissal Without Prejudice, R. 634-636. 
F. Was it reversible error for the District Court to grant Douglas attorney's fees 
against Nipper? 
Preserved for Appeal in Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Rule 11 
Sanctions, R. 512-521 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
"Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of material fact 
exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Jones v. ERA 
Brokers Consol.. 2000 UT 61, ffi[ 8, 6 P.3d 1129: see also Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "We 
review a trial court's grant of summary judgment for correctness, giving no deference to 
its conclusions of law." Id. (citing Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & 
Forestry. 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990)). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
David Nipper consigned his classic 1957 Black and White Chevrolet to 
Remember When for sale. Remember When entered into a contract to sell the car to the 
Ludwigs, took the Ludwigs' money and delivered the car to the Ludwigs. Nipper's son, 
Paul, noticed that the car was not at Remember When some time later, and inquired 
about it. Nipper's son was told that the Car had been sold and after some effort, received 
a check from Remember When. The check was dishonored. Nipper has never been paid 
for the car, and spent thousands of dollars trying to obtain some relief. 
Nipper filed suit against Douglas, Nichols, Gent and Remember When in a case 
still pending before Judge Fredericks (the Fredericks Case). Nipper obtained judgment 
against Remember When, but Judge Fredericks ruled that the limited liability shield 
protected Douglas from personal liability for the actions of Remember When. 
Nipper was sued by the Ludwigs in the Sandy Division of the Third District Court 
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(the "Ludwig Case"). The Ludwigs sought (1) to get an order forcing Nipper to turn the 
title to the car over to the Ludwigs and (2) to recover from Remember When's bond. The 
bonding company interpled the proceeds of their bond and brought several other bond 
claimants into this Ludwig Case. Nipper learned for the first time from this Ludwig Case 
that there were others like himself and the Ludwigs that had also been defrauded by 
Remember When, Douglas, Nichols and Gent. The Ludwigs obtained an order forcing 
Nipper to turn title to the car over to the Ludwigs under the operation of the UCC. 
Nipper settled with the Ludwigs by delivering title to the car, but in exchange obtained an 
assignment of the Ludwigs' claims of any nature against Douglas, et al. 
Because Remember When ceased to do business and is judgment proof, and 
because Nipper received very little from the bonding company settlement in the Ludwig 
Case (his attorney's fees far exceeded the bonding company payment), Nipper filed the 
instant suit alleging the same underlying facts that Nipper alleged in the Frederick's 
lawsuit (and upon which Nipper obtained his original judgment against Remember 
When), but adding the allegations relating to the Ludwig claims which Nipper now 
owns as part of his shotgun marriage/settlement with the Ludwigs, and the defrauding of 
the many other individuals and/or entities which came to light in the Ludwig Case, and 
alleging that Douglas and the other defendants were guilty of racketeering conduct and 
civil conspiracy - entirely different theories for relief. 
Nipper filed a motion for summary judgment on his and the assigned Ludwig 
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claims against Douglas. Douglas responded with his own Motion for Summary Judgment 
based upon Res Judicata flowing from Judge Fredericks' prior ruling that Douglas was 
shielded from personal liability for Remember When's wrongful conduct due to the 
operation of the limited liability company shield. Nipper opposed on the grounds that (1) 
Remember When was dissolved at the time and could not shield Douglas from personal 
liability, (2) there were new parties/claims (the "Ludwig Claims"), (3) new factual 
allegations (the pattern of racketeering conduct), and (4) new theories for relief (RICO 
and civil conspiracy). 
Judge Noel denied Nipper's motion for summary judgment, and granted Douglas' 
cross Motion for Summary Judgment based upon the alleged res judicata effect of Judge 
Frederick's prior ruling. 
Nipper then learned of the criminal guilty pleas/convictions of Nichols, Douglas 
and Gent (second degree felonies) relating directly to Nipper's claims. Nipper filed a 
Motion to Reconsider alleging that this was proof positive - res judicata if you will - that 
Douglas, Nichols and Gent were in fact racketeers and co-conspirators and that Nipper 
should be allowed to proceed on his and the Ludwigs' RICO and civil conspiracy claims 
against Douglas. 
This motion was denied. 
Nipper then asked Judge Noel not to make the dismissal be one with prejudice, 
because the Fredericks Case is still pending and a motion to consolidate and/or for leave 
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to amend could still be filed in the Fredericks Case to preserve these claims. Judge 
Noel's hand-written language on the Douglas Final Order suggests that he did not intend 
for his order to preclude any such motions, but Nipper wants to make sure herein. 
Nipper filed this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff David E. Nipper at the time had his residence in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. David is the father of Paul Nipper who acted as an agent for David E. 
Nipper in connection with the automobile sales transaction. R. 138-142 
2. Defendant John H. Douglas ("Douglas") is the general partner in the 
Defendant Douglas Family Limited Partnership and lives in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. R. 138-142 
3. Defendant Remember When Classic and Performance Cars ("Remember 
When") was a consignment sales car lot holding itself out to the public as specializing in 
"Classic and Performance Cars." Remember When is now defunct but was at all relevant 
times solely owned by John Douglas and was located at 1450 South 400 West, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. R. 138-142 
4. T-D Enterprises, L.L.C. is a now defunct Utah Limited Liability Company that, 
when in existence, claimed to hold Remember When as a division of its business. R. 138-
142 
5. Richard A. Nichols ("Nichols") was associated with Remember When as a 
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sales agent. Nichols purported to own the successor in interest of Remember When, 
"Cruzin Klassics and Kustoms." R. 138-142 
6. Defendant Michael D. Gent ( "Gent") was associated with Remember When as an 
accountant. R. 138-142 
7. On or about October 5, 1998, David Nipper and his son, Paul Nipper stopped 
by the Remember When car lot and discussed with Nichols the procedure for consigning 
David Nipper's 1957 black Chevrolet vehicle. Remember When displayed a license 
indicating that they were a bonded automobile dealer. David Nipper's Chevrolet had won 
many awards in automobile shows and Nichols rated the vehicle as a perfect "10" (on a 
scale of 1 to 10) on an intake form completed October 15, 1998. At this meeting, David 
explained to Nichols that he was going out of the state for a while and that he would have 
his son, Paul, act as his agent in the consignment of the vehicle. R. 138-142 
8. On or about October 15, 1998, Paul Nipper brought David's 1957 Chevy to 
Remember When and completed a consignment sale contract. The contract provided that 
Remember When would pay David Nipper a minimum of $22,000 after the successful 
sale of his car. The contract also provided that Remember When would pay David Nipper 
within 21 days of the sale. In reliance upon these representations, Paul Nipper signed the 
contract on behalf of David Nipper. Nichols signed on behalf of Remember When. R. 
138-142 
9. In early March of 1999, Paul Nipper checked the Remember When showroom and 
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discovered that the 1957 Chevy was missing. None of the people at the shop could tell him where 
the car was or whether it had been sold. Over a series of days and several visits to Remember 
When Paul Nipper finally learned that the vehicle had been sold on or about January 26, 1999. 
Paul Nipper demanded payment and was then rebuffed by Remember When, who came up with 
one excuse after another for not paying David for his share of the vehicle sale. R. 138-142 
10. Finally, Remember When provided Paul Nipper with a check for $22,000, 
representing to Paul Nipper that the check represented full payment for the sale of David 
Nipper's vehicle under the contract. The check, however, was not honored by Remember When's 
bank. It was reported to Paul Nipper that there were insufficient funds in the Remember When 
account. Additional telephone calls to the bank showed that there was never enough money in the 
account to cover the check. A few days after being presented with the check, Paul Nipper called 
the bank and found that Remember When had placed a stop payment on his check. R. 138-142 
Subsequent telephone calls with Remember When yielded deceitful and misleading excuses for 
the failure to honor the check including an allegation that Paul Nipper was an imposter and that 
there was a defect with the title. Finally, telephone calls from Nipper's counsel with Michael 
Gent at Remember When resulted in a concession that there was nothing wrong with the 
vehicle's title and an admission that Remember When knew that Paul Nipper was David's agent. 
R. 138-142 
11. On August 24, 1999, David E. Nipper sent a letter of complaint to the Utah State 
Department of Motor Vehicles Enforcement Division setting forth the above factual allegations. 
R. 138-142 
12. Jim Ludwig and Ruth Ludwig (collectively the "Ludwigs"), in late 1998 or early 
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1999, located a 1957 black and white Chevrolet at the Remember When location. They made 
contact with Nichols, who identified himself as the sales manager for Remember When. After a 
few more visits to Remember When, the Ludwigs inquired of Nichols about who owned the 1957 
Chevrolet. The Ludwigs were told that Remember When held title to the vehicle and could 
transfer the same to the Ludwigs. R. 138-142 
13. After further negotiations, the Ludwigs agreed to buy the 1957 Chevrolet for the 
purchase price, including tax, license and registration, of $26,822.00. Remember When placed a 
temporary Utah automobile permit on the vehicle so it could be driven during the time period the 
Luwigs waited for final registration and license plates. R. 138-142 
14. At or near the expiration of the first temporary permit period, the Ludwigs were 
advised by Nichols that there was a slight delay in processing paperwork but that it would be 
handled expeditiously. At that time, he issued a second temporary permit to the Ludwigs. 
However, the registration still was not provided to the Ludwigs and, once again, Nichols assured 
them that the matter would be taken care. R. 138-142 
15. When the second temporary permit expired, the Ludwigs contacted the State of Utah 
Motor Vehicle Department, Fraud division, and learned that title to the 1957 Chevrolet 
was not held in the name of Remember When, or T.D Enterprises, or John Douglas, or Richard 
Nichols, but rather in David Nipper. Further requests by the Ludwigs of Remember When for 
production of title fell upon deaf ears. R. 138-142 
16. Not knowing anything about the Ludwigs or their claims, in April of 1999, Nipper 
filed suit against Douglas, T-D Enterprises, LLC dba Remember When and Richard Nichols, 
Civil No.990904084. Judge J. Dennis Fredericks was assigned to this case. (The "Fredericks 
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Case"), R. 224, Judicial Notice of Civil No. 990904084. 
17. Nipper obtained judgment against Remember When in the Fredericks Case, which 
became Res Judicata as to the facts supporting that judgment. Judicial Notice of Civil No. 
990904084 
18. Nipper filed a motion for summary judgment against Douglas in the Fredericks 
Case. Douglas filed a cross-motion for summary judgment alleging that the limited liability 
company veil should not be pierced as against Douglas. R. 249-50, 224, 253-261. 
19. Judge Fredericks ruled that Douglas had no personal liability to Douglas "for the 
reasons specified in [Douglas'] supporting memoranda. R. 251-252. 
20. The Ludwigs filed their own action in the Sandy Division, Civil No. 99040764, on 
September 1, 1999 - four months after Nipper filed the Fredericks Case. In this action the 
Ludwigs sued Nipper to force him to give them title to the car, and the bonding company on 
Remember When's bond, and Douglas et al for damages. (The "Ludwig Case"). R. 137, 222. 
21. In October of 1999, Western Surety Company answered the Ludwigs' complaint, 
interpled the proceeds of the bond and starting bringing into the Ludwig action other entities 
making claims against the bond. It was not until then that Nipper became aware that there were 
others like himself and the Ludwigs who had also been defrauded. R. 222 
22. The Ludwigs were able to obtain an order directing Nipper to turn title to the car 
over to them. This precipitated a settlement between Nipper and the Ludwigs whereby Nipper 
acquired the Ludwigs' claims of any nature against the defendants herein. R. 137, Judicial 
Notice of Civil No. 990407964 
23. After learning from the Ludwig Case that fraud had also been perpetrated against a 
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half-dozen or so other entities, Nipper filed the Racketeering Complaint herein against Douglas, 
Nichols, Gent and others, on his own behalf and as assignee of the Ludwigs' claims. R. 1-17. 
24. On January 10, 2002, Nipper filed a motion for summary judgment against Douglas. 
R. 134-202 
25. On January 31, 2002, Douglas opposed Nipper's motion and filed his own cross 
motion for summary judgment, alleging that res judicata (from Judge Frederick's prior ruling that 
Douglas was not personally liable for Remember When's actions against Nipper due to 
Remember When's limited liability shield)(which order resolved alter ego, bond and license 
claims theories against Douglas) barred anymore claims against Douglas. R. 219-327 
26. Nipper opposed Douglas' motion for summary judgment, arguing that res judicata 
did not apply because (a) there was and still is no final order in the Fredericks' case, (b) the 
parties are different (i.e., the Ludwigs' claims for relief), (c) the facts relating to multiple frauds 
and the pattern of racketeering and conspiracy were new and different, and (d) the legal theories 
of RICO and civil conspiracy were different and unresolved by the prior case's limited 
ruling/findings. R. 336-401, 404-417, 512 
27. Judge Noel denied Nipper/Ludwig's motion for summary judgment, and granted 
Douglas' motion on res judicata grounds. R. 532, 576-577 
28. Nipper then became aware that Douglas and Gent had pleaded guilty to two second 
degree felonies each, and Nichols was convicted of several felonies after a trial, arising from 
their operation of Remember When and specifically dealing with the fraud against Nipper. 
Consequently, Nipper filed a Motion to Reconsider in which Nipper brought these criminal 
pleas/conviction to Judge Noel's attention and suggested that not only should Douglas not be 
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dismissed from this case, but that these criminal pleas should be considered res judicata as to 
Douglas' RICO and civil conspiracy liability to Nipper. R. 578-589. 
29. Judge Noel denied the Motion for Reconsideration. R. 632-33. 
30. Nipper Objected and asked Judge Noel not to make the Dismissal of Douglas one 
with prejudice. R. 634-636. Judge Noel made a hand-written notation on his Final Order 
indicating that his ruling should not preclude any consolidation or amendment sought in the 
Fredericks Case. R. 640-41. 
31. Nipper filed his appeal herein. R. 642-45 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Claim preclusion requires three showings: (1) same parties or privies, (2) the claim 
must have been presented in first case, or could have and/or should have been presented 
in the first case, and (3) the first case has resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
Judge Noel's Rulings which are appealed herein incorrectly applied these 
principles to the foregoing facts as follows: 
a. Criteria (3) Is Not Met - There Is No Final Judgment in the Fredericks Case. 
Since the Fredericks Case is not finalized, and Judge Fredericks still has discretion 
to change any of his rulings therein, Claims Preclusion cannot apply to any of 
Nipper's or Ludwigs' claims. 
b. Criteria (1) is Not Met With Respect to the Assigned Ludwig Claims - The 
Ludwigs Were Not Parties to the Fredericks Case, nor Privies to Nipper. 
Since the Ludwigs were not a party to the Fredericks Case, Criteria (1) is not met 
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as to their claims which were assigned to Nipper, 
c. Criteria (2) - That the Claims/Issues Were Brought or Could/Should Have 
Been Brought in the Prior Action - is Not Met as to the Ludwig Claims and 
all RICO and Civil Conspiracy Claims. The Ludwig Claims, and the RICO and 
Civil Conspiracy Claims are not in the Frederick Case. The issue, then, is whether 
they could have/ should have been raised in that case. Nipper did not know who 
the Ludwigs were when he filed his complaint in the Fredericks Case. Similarly, 
Nipper did not know that Douglas, Gent and Nichols had defrauded over a half-
dozen other people when he filed his complaint. Because he did not know these 
facts, he could not have brought his claims for RICO or Civil Conspiracy in his 
original complaint. 
The elements of Issue Preclusion are similarly not met. 
With none of the Douglas related cases (the Fredericks Case, the Ludwig Case, 
and this Noel Case) fully and finally resolved, the Guilty Pleas of Douglas and Gent, and 
the Guilty Verdict against Nichols on multiple felony counts should be res judicata as to 
the racketeering and civil conspiracy claims by Nipper/Ludwig against these now 
convicted felons. 
Since the Fredericks Case is still pending without a final judgment, the claims 
against Douglas should not be dismissed with prejudice because they still can be brought 
in the Fredericks Case. 
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Finally, the Rule 11 sanctions against Nipper and counsel must be reversed if this 
Court reverses the dismissals ordered by Judge Noel. 
ARGUMENT 
Elements of Res Judicata. In Culbertson V. Board, County Comrru Salt Lake 
Cv., 2001 UT 108, 44 P.3d 642 (Utah 2001), the Utah Supreme Court noted: 
"The doctrine of <res> <judicata> describes the binding effect of a previous 
adjudication on a current adjudication. See 18 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal 
Practice and Procedure §§ 4402 (1981). We have used the general term "<res> 
<judicata>M as an umbrella to refer to two distinct branches of the doctrine: claim 
preclusion and issue preclusion.[fn6] See Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Newavs, Inc., 
2000 UT 93, fflf 19, 16 P.3d 1214 fciting Swainston v. Intermountain Health Care. 
766 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1988)). Although both branches of <res> <judicata> 
l|X
 serve[] the important policy of preventing previously litigated issues from being 
relitigated,'" different rules apply to each. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Salt 
Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 913 P.2d 731, 733 (Utah 1995)). We will 
address each in turn. 
In general terms, claim preclusion bars a party from prosecuting in a subsequent 
action a claim that has been fully litigated previously. See Silver Fork Pipeline. 
913 P.2d at 733. For claim preclusion to bar a claim in a subsequent action, 
(1) the subsequent action must involve the same parties, their privies, or their 
assigns as the first action, 
(2) the claim to be barred must have been brought or have been available in the 
first action, and 
(3) the first action must have produced a final judgment on the merits of the claim. 
See Fitzgerald v. Corbett 793 P.2d356, 359 (Utah 1990)." 
There Is No Final Judgment in the Fredericks Case. Claims preclusion can not 
bar any of the claims in the Noel Case because there is no Final Judgment in the 
Fredericks Case. The claims which seem most appropriate for dismissal were Nipper's 
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own claims against Douglas under the theories of "no limited liability company/' "alter 
ego," and/or "pierce the veil." Even though Nipper had obtained a judgment against 
Remember When, these theories for relief against Douglas personally were in fact 
dismissed by Judge Fredericks. If any claims should have been dismissed, these claims 
are the most likely candidates. But, since there is no final judgment in the Fredericks 
Case, arguably even these claims should not have been dismissed. 
But there can be no doubt that the other claims: 
- Nipper's own claims under RICO and Civil Conspiracy, and 
- All of the Ludwigs' claims which were assigned 
should not have been dismissed because not only were they not raised in the Fredericks 
Case, but there is no final judgment in the Fredericks Case. 
The Ludwigs Were Not Parties In the Fredericks Case, Nor Were They 
Privies of Nipper. The Ludwig Claims assigned to Nipper should not have been 
dismissed by Judge Noel because (a) the Ludwigs were not parties to the Fredericks Case, 
and (2) the Ludwigs are not "privies" with Nipper. Criteria No. 1 is not satisfied as to the 
Ludwig Claims - including those against Douglas for "no limited liability company," 
"alter ego," and/or "pierce the corporate veil." 
Nipper Was Wholly Unaware of the Ludwigs9 Claims or of the Facts Giving 
Rise to the RICO and Civil Conspiracy Claims When the Fredericks Case was Filed. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Newavs. Inc., 2000 UT 93, 16 
17 
P.3d 1214 (Utah 2000), described how Criteria No. 2 is construed when the facts and/or 
claims were not known by the first plaintiff at the time that he filed his prior complaint: 
"In reference to the second element of the test outlined above, Neways argued 
before the court of appeals that Macris's claims for fraudulent transfer, successor liability, 
and alter ego "should have been raised" in Macris I because Macris knew of its claims 
against Neways before the trial in Macris I began and should therefore have amended its 
complaint in that action and asserted the claims now pursued in the present action. 
"The court of appeals rejected Neways's argument and held that the doctrine of 
claim preclusion did not require Macris to litigate its claims against Neways in Macris I 
because "the facts giving rise to Macris's claims against Neways . . . arose after Macris 
filed its amended complaint against Images." Macris & Assocs. v. Neways, Inc., 1999 UT 
App 230, 986 P.2d 748. In so holding, the court of appeals adopted the rule that a party is 
required to include claims in an action for <res> <judicata> purposes only if "those 
claims . . . arose before the filing of the complaint in the first action." Id. at^ flf 9. 
"Neways now argues before this court that the court of appeals erred in adopting 
the above-mentioned test, and contends that this court should adopt an alternate <res> 
<judicata> test requiring joinder of all claims arising before entry of judgment where the 
plaintiff has sufficient notice and opportunity to join such claims. Neways contends that 
the <res> <judicata> test adopted by the court of appeals is inconsistent with this court's 
decision in Badger v. Badger, 69 Utah 293, 254 P. 784 (1927), and the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
"Neways's reliance on Badger is misplaced. In Badger, the defendant twice 
petitioned the trial court for modification of a divorce decree. See Badger, 69 Utah at 
296-97, 254 P. at 785-86. The defendant's first petition sought modification on the ground 
that the property settlement on which the decree was based was induced by the plaintiffs 
misrepresentations and omissions concerning his assets. See 69 Utah at 296-97, 254 P. at 
785. The trial court modified the decree and ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant an 
additional amount. See 69 Utah at 296, 254 P. at 785-86. Two weeks later, the defendant 
filed a second petition, alleging other misrepresentations that the plaintiff had originally 
made. See 69 Utah at 296-97, 254 P. at 786. The plaintiff moved to strike the second 
petition on <res> <judicata> grounds, claiming that the court's decision concerning the 
first petition barred relief on the second. See 69 Utah at 298-99, 254 P. at 786. The trial 
court granted the motion. See 69 Utah at 299, 254 P. at 786. On appeal, this court 
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affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the defendant's second petition on <res> <judicata> 
grounds. In so holding, this court stated: It affirmatively is made to appear that at the time 
the first petition was filed for a modification of the decree of divorce the defendant knew 
the contents of said decree and that she was to receive no property except that actually 
awarded to her. . . . [T]he appellant had as much knowledge about the plaintiffs property 
and income at the time she filed her first petition as she had at the time she filed the 
[second] petition which was stricken. 69 Utah at 301, 254 P. at 787 (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, Badger is consistent with the rule that a plaintiff need only include claims in 
a suit for <res> <judicata> purposes if the plaintiff was aware of the facts upon which the 
later claims were based at the time the first suit was filed. 
"Equally misplaced is Neways's argument that the court of appeals' decision 
creates confusion between the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the doctrine of <res> 
<judicata>. According to Neways, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure "clearly establish an 
intent that pleadings . . . should be amended as additional facts and claims are discovered" 
and a rule requiring amendment for <res> <judicata> purposes should therefore be 
adopted. While the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do allow for the amendment of 
pleadings to add additional parties or claims for relief, they do not require it. See Utah R. 
Civ. P. 15(a) ("A party may amend his pleading. . . ." (emphasis added)); Utah R. Civ. P. 
20(a) ("All persons may be joined in one action as defendants. . . ." (emphasis added)). 
Therefore, it is clear that the rule espoused by Neways, requiring that pleadings be 
amended for <res> <judicata> purposes as additional facts and claims are discovered, 
would be inconsistent with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, we affirm the 
court of appeals' adoption of the rule that a party is required to include claims in an action 
for <res> <judicata> purposes only if those claims arose before the filing of the complaint 
in the first action. 
"A number of states and federal courts in other jurisdictions addressing this issue 
have come to a similar conclusion, holding that parties are required to include claims in 
an action for <res> <judicata> purposes only if those claims arose before the filing of the 
complaint in the earlier action. See Maharaj v. Bankamerica Corp., 128 F.3d 94, 97 (2d 
Cir. 1997); Computer Assocs. Int'l Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 126 F.3d 365, 369-70 (2d Cir. 
1997); Doe v. Allied-Signal Inc., 985 F.2d 908, 915 (7th Cir. 1993); Manning v. City of 
Auburn, 953 F.2d 1355, 1360 (11th Cir. 1992); Dillard v. Security Pacific Brokers, Inc., 
835 F.2d 607, 609 (5th Cir. 1988); Los Angeles Branch NAACP v. Los Angeles Unified 
Sch. Dist., 750 F.2d 731, 739 (9th Cir. 1984); Andrews v. Wade & De Young, Inc., 950 
P.2d 574, 576 (Alaska 1997); Bolte v. Aits, Inc., 587 P.2d 810, 813-14 (Haw. 1978); 
Durrant v. Quality First Mktg., Inc., 903 P.2d 147, 149-50 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995); Ben C. 
Jones & Co. v. Gammel-Statesman Publ'g Co., 99 S.W. 701, 703 (Tex. 1907). 
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"Applying the test to the facts of this case, the court of appeals was correct in 
concluding that <res> <judicata> does not bar Macris's claims against Neways for 
fraudulent transfer, successor liability, and alter ego. The facts giving rise to Macrisfs 
claims Images's transfer of its assets to Neways and Neways's subsequent takeover 
of Images's business did not arise until after the filing of the complaint in Macris I 
Thus, Macris was not obligated to amend its complaint in Macris I to include the claims 
now pursued in the present action against Neways. 
"Moreover, for the doctrine of <res> <judicata> to preclude a subsequent cause of 
action, not only must the plaintiff have been aware of the cause of action at the time the 
first suit was commenced, but the cause of action in the present suit must be identical to 
the one brought in the prior suit. See Schaer, 657 P.2d at 1340 ("In order for <res> 
<judicata> to apply, both suits must involve the same parties or their privies and also the 
same cause of action. . . .'" (quoting Searle Bros, v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 690 (Utah 
1978))). In determining whether claims are identical for <res> <judicata> purposes, this 
court has focused on whether "[t]he two causes of action rest on a different state of facts 
and evidence of a different kind or character is necessary to sustain the two causes of 
action." Schaer, 657 P.2d at 1340; see also 46 Am. Jur.2d Judgments §§ 534 (1994) 
(describing identity of facts or evidence test). Therefore, even if a plaintiff is aware of the 
factual basis of a suit at the filing of another suit, he or she is not obligated to bring all 
claims together if there is no identity of facts and evidence between the two claims. 
"Macris I arose out of the formation of a distributorship agreement between 
Macris and Images in August 1989 and Images's 1991 breach of that agreement. In 
Macris L Macris and Images litigated, whether an enforceable agreement existed between 
the parties, whether Images breached that Agreement, and the amount of damages that 
should be awarded for that breach. 
"In contrast, Macris II arose out of the formation of Neways in August 1992, the 
transfer by Images of its assets to Neways on September 1, 1992, three days before the 
original trial date in Macris L and Neways's subsequent takeover of Images's multilevel 
marketing business. Macris based its claims in Macris II on the Utah Fraudulent Transfer 
Act and similar common law doctrines designed to protect creditors from the evasions of 
debtors. Specifically, Macris claimed that Images's transfer of its assets to Neways three 
days before the trial in Macris I was scheduled to begin was fraudulent and accomplished 
to limit the amount of damages available to Macris and to hinder Macris from collecting 
the obligation owed by Images. 
"Accordingly, it is clear that Macris's claims against Neways in Macris II rest upon 
a different set of facts, and evidence of a different kind or character is necessary to 
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sustain the claims, than the breach of contract litigation that was the subject of Macris I. 
Therefore, even if Macris had known of the relevant facts of Macris II at the filing of 
Macris I and it did not it still would have been justified in not including its 
fraudulent transfer, successor liability, and alter ego claims in the first lawsuit. " 
The foregoing analysis is directly on point with the facts of the current case and the RICO 
and Civil Conspiracy Claims. First, "[t]he facts giving rise to [Nipper's and Ludwigs' 
RICO and Civil Conspiracy] claims ... [were not known] until after the filing of the 
complaint in [Fredericks Case]. Thus, [Nipper] was not obligated to amend [his] 
complaint in [the Fredericks Case] to include the claims now pursued in the present action 
against [Douglas for RICO and Civil Conspiracy]." Further, even if Nipper had known of 
the facts supporting the RICO and Civil Conspiracy Claims, these claims "rest upon a 
different set of facts" - the pattern of racketeering activity - than that pled in the original 
Nipper complaint in the Frederick Case. "[E]vidence of a different kind or character [will 
be] necessary to sustain the [RICO and Civil Conspiracy] claims, than the breach of 
contract litigation" in the Fredericks Case. 
The claims in the Noel Action are not "identical" to the claims in the Fredericks 
Action. 
For all of these reasons, Claims Preclusion does not bar the claims against Douglas 
in this action. 
"Issue Preclusion" Similarly Does Not Bar Nipper's and the Ludwigs9 Claims 
in This Action. Even if "Claims Preclusion" does not bar the claims against Douglas 
raised in this action, it is possible that "Issue Preclusion" could still bar them. In this 
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regard, the Utah Supreme Court in Macris, supra, noted that: 
"We thus turn our attention to the merits of Neways's argument that Macris is 
precluded by <res> <judicata>, more specifically the issue preclusion branch of <res> 
<judicata>,[fn7] from pursuing additional contract damages in this case. 
We apply a four-part test to determine whether the doctrine of issue preclusion is 
applicable: 
First, the issue challenged must be identical in the previous action and in the case 
at hand. 
Second, the issue must have been decided in a final judgment on the merits in the 
previous action. 
Third, the issue must have been competently, fully, and fairly litigated in the 
previous action. 
Fourth, the party against whom collateral estoppel is invoked in the current action 
must have been either a party or privy to a party in the previous action. 
Jones. Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1370 (Utah 1996); 
see also Swainston, 766 P.2d at 1061. AH four elements must be present for issue 
preclusion to apply. See Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 923 P.2d at 1370." 
(Emphasis added) 
Again, Issue Preclusion comes very close to barring Nipper from raising his "no 
limited liability company," "alter ego," and "pierce the veil" claims in this action. The 
only problem is with second prong - there is no final judgment in the Fredericks Case. 
Prong two - no final judgment in the Fredericks Case - is missing as to each and every 
claim in this case. Since "all four elements must be present for issue preclusion to apply," 
(Ibid.), the fact that there is no final judgment in the Fredericks Case requires reversal of 
Judge Noel's dismissal of all of the claims in this action against Douglas. 
22 
But with respect to the Ludwigs' claims, Prong four is also missing. The Ludwigs 
were not parties to the Fredericks Case nor privies of Nipper. 
Finally, with respect to the RICO and Civil Conspiracy Claims, the "issue" of 
whether Douglas was involved in RICO and Civil Conspiracy activities was not fully and 
fairly litigated in the Fredericks Case. It was not even pled in that case, much less fully 
and fairly litigated. The dismissal of the RICO and Civil Conspiracy Claims was clearly 
not warranted by Issue Preclusion. 
None of the claims against Douglas should have been dismissed because there was 
and still is no final judgment in the Fredericks Case. But, at the very least, all of the 
Ludwig Claims and the RICO and Civil Conspiracy Claims should not have been 
dismissed for multiple failures to satisfy the tests for claims and/or issue preclusion. 
The Felony Guilty Pleas of Douglas and Gent and the Guilty Verdict Against 
Nichols, Should Have Been Res Judicata on the RICO and Civil Conspiracy Claims 
Against Douglas. "Issue Preclusion" should have operated to require a finding of 
liability under RICO and Civil Conspiracy against Douglas due to his guilty pleas to 
criminal conduct against Nipper. All four elements are met: (1) the issue of 
fraudulent/criminal activity against Nipper and others was raised in the criminal 
prosecution, (2) the matter was tried to a final conclusion - a guilty pleas and a guilty 
verdict and convictions of all charged, (3) the matter was "fully and fairly litigated" due 
to the voluntary guilty plea and conviction of Douglas on multiple felony counts, and (4) 
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the prosecution acted essentially for and on behalf of Nipper and the Ludwigs in bringing 
criminal action against Douglas and the others for his wrongful conduct vis-a-vis Nipper 
and the Ludwigs (Douglas was ordered to pay restitution to Nipper as part of his 
sentence). 
Douglas should be declared liable to Nipper under the RICO and Civil Conspiracy 
claims for relief, with only the issue of Nipper's damages left to be determined. 
Since These Claims Could Still be Raised in the Fredericks Case, They Should 
Not be Dismissed with Prejudice Herein. It appears that Judge Noel agreed with 
Nipper's objection to the Final Order when Judge Noel made a hand-written note that his 
ruling should not preclude any effort to try and consolidate this case with the Fredericks 
Case, or to seek to amend the complaint in the Fredericks Case to add these claims. Since 
the Fredericks Case has not been completely and finally resolved, Judge Frederick still 
has discretion to reconsider and revise each and every decision that he has already made 
therein, and to allow amendments to the pleadings under Rule 15. Armed Forces 
Insurance Exchange v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14. Just to be sure, Nipper respectfully 
requests that this Court require that any dismissal which may be upheld by the Court's 
ruling on this appeal be without prejudice. 
Because It Was Not Improper for Nipper to Raise the Claims Against Douglas 
Herein, Judge Noel Should Not Have Granted any Sanctions Against Nipper and 
Nipper's Counsel. Nipper was not in fact precluded from raising the claims against 
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Douglas which were pleaded in Nipper's Racketeering Complaint herein - and certainly 
not those of the Ludwigs or the RICO and Civil Conspiracy Claims. Consequently, not 
only should the dismissal of those claims be reversed, but the awarding of attorney's fees 
to Douglas should be set aside. 
SUMMARY OF RELIEF REQUESTED 
Plaintiff/Appellant Nipper requests this Court to: 
1. Reverse Judge Noels' Order Dismissing all claims against Douglas herein. 
2. Reverse Judge Noels' Order granting Douglas attorney's fees. 
3. Direct that the issue of Douglas' liability to Nipper under the RICO and Civil 
Conspiracy Claims herein be directed in favor of Nipper, with the issue of 
damages left to be determined at trial. 
4. Order that the dismissal of any claims which are affirmed by this Court be 
dismissed only without prejudice. 
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of May, 2003. 
Steffensen ••• Law ••• Office 
Brian W. Sieffensen 
AttoKQeysobr Plaintiff frakk^fi. Nipper 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the / ? day of /V*n 2°&3
 ? i caused two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing instrument to be /^mailed, postage prepaid; and/or hand-
delivered by fax and/or by courier; addressed to: 
Preston S. Howell 
3386 Ramsey Circle 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84120 
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Addendum A 
Order on Rule 11 Sanctions 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
APR - 9 2002 
Preston S. Howell, #8547 
Attorney for John H. Douglas 
3386 Ramsey Circle 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84120 
Telephone: (801)840-9831 
By. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
JN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT TN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID E. NIPPER, 
Individually, and asserting claims 
assigned to him by Jim Ludwig 
and Ruth Ludwig, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN H. DOUGLAS, DOUGLAS 
FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 
JULIE DOUGLAS, JOHN CHASE 
DOUGLAS, TRACY WILSON, MEGAN 
WILSON, CAMERON WILSON, 
WHITNEY WILSON, T-D 
AUTOMOBILE SALES, L.L.C. aka T-D 
ENTERPRISES, L.L.C. dba REMEMBER 
WHEN CLASSIC AND PERFORMANCE 
MOTOR CARS, RICHARD A. NICHOLS, 
MICHAEL D. GENT, CRUZIN' 
KLASSICS AND KUSTOMS, JOHN 
DOES 1-500, 
Defendant, 
ORDER ON RULE 11 SANCTIONS 
Case No. 010904479 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
The above-entitled case came for hearing before this Court on March 29, 2002 
before the Honorable Frank G. Noel. The plaintiff was represented by William J. 
Middleton. The defendant John H. Douglas w?as represented by Preston S. Howell 
At the hearing, on the court's own initiative, Plaintiffs attorney was required to 
explain why attorney's fees should not be granted to Defendant. Rule 11 Sanctions were 
also requested by Defendant through a motion filed with the court. 
The Court having heard oral argument and having reviewed the file herein, and 
finding good cause therefore, now makes the following order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff and Plaintiff s attorney5 s are to pay 
Defendant his direct attorney's fees and costs incurred in this case according to the 
Affidavit of Attorney's Fees that has been filed with the Court. The conduct that is the 
basis for these sanctions is causing needless increase in the cost of litigation by filing the 
Complaint in this case while two actions concerning the same facts were being litigated 
in two different courts. Also, because Res judicata clearly applies to this case, Plaintiffs 
claims are not warranted by the existing law. 
DATED this H d a y o f i w X K , ,2002 
By the Court 
Honorable Frank 0% 
Third District O 
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Addendum B 
First Final Order 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUL 1 5 2002 
4JJSALT LAKE COUNTY 
«*» H ^ 
Preston S. Howell, #8547 V) Deputy ciork 
Attorney for John H. Douglas 
3386 Ramsey Circle 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84120 
Telephone: (801)840-9831 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID E. NIPPER, 
Individually, and asserting claims 
assigned to him by Jim Ludwig 
and Ruth Ludwig, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHNH. DOUGLAS, DOUGLAS 
FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 
JULIE DOUGLAS, JOHN CHASE 
DOUGLAS, TRACY WILSON, MEGAN 
WILSON, CAMERON WILSON, 
WHITNEY WILSON, T-D 
AUTOMOBILE SALES, L L C . akaT-D 
ENTERPRISES, L.L.C. dba REMEMBER 
WHEN CLASSIC AND PERFORMANCE 
MOTOR CARS, RICHARD A. NICHOLS, 
MICHAEL D. GENT, CRUZIN' 




Case No. 010904479 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
The above-entitled case came for hearing before this Court in connection with (1) 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, (2) Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Defendant's 
Opposing Memorandum, (3) Defendant John H. Douglas's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and (4) Defendant's Motion for Enlargement of time to respond to Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment. The hearing was held on March 29, 2002 before the 
Honorable Frank G. Noel. The plaintiff was represented by William J. Middleton. The 
defendant John H. Douglas was represented by Preston S. Howell. 
Also at the hearing, on the court's own initiative, Plaintiffs attorney was required 
to explain why attorney's fees should not be granted to Defendant. 
The Court having heard oral argument and having reviewed the file herein, and 
finding good cause therefore, now makes the following order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, because res judicata clearly applies to all 
Plaintiffs claims against John H. Douglas, Defendant John H. Douglas's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Motion for Enlargement of Time are granted. Further, 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike are denied. Plaintiffs' 
claims against John H, Douglas &re therefore dismissed with prejudice. 
/ d day of O" DATED this U _0 2002 






Middleton Letter regarding Guilty Pleas 
Steffensen • Law • Office h,rd JmeM 0 i s ,™< 
UA 1U44 
ition 
0 0 is £ 
Brian W. Steffensen 
Kelly J. Ryan J 
Damian E. Davenport ttt 
William J. Middleton 
AFrafessf^ggty] 
district 
B y ^ J ^ ^ K * COUNTY t 
By. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SALT LAKE LAW OFFICE 
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 485-3707 
Facsimile: (801)485-7140 
$ Also Admitted in California 
t t t Also Admitted in Ohio 
Deputy Clerk 
May 13, 2002 
Judge Frank Noel 
Third District Court 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
VIA Hand Delivery Re: Nipper v. Douglas, et al.,case 
#010904479; 
Dear Judge Noel: 
We are counsel for David Nipper in the above-entitled case. It has come to our attention 
that the two individual Defendants in the above-referenced case, John H. Douglas and Richard A. 
Nichols, have pled guilty to (Douglas) two second degree felonies in abeyance-Attempted 
Communications Fraud- and been found guilty of six second degree felonies, Communications 
Fraud, (Nichols) after trial in the West Valley Division of Third District Court. The case number 
for Douglas' criminal case is # 011101097, and for Nichols #011101002. Nichols was found 
guilty on the specific felony count relating to his conduct as against Nipper. (Please see attached 
Salt Lake Tribune news story). Given this development, we wanted the Court to know that we 
intend to file appropriate motions in the very near future which will address these criminal 
convictions. In that light, we would request that any actions in the case- making orders final, etc-
be forestalled so that we may file said motions. Please let us know if there is anything else you 
need. 
Sincerely Yours, 
William J. Middleton 
cc: Samuel McVey 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Michael Gent 
4554 South Jarrah Street 
TaylorsviUe, Utah 84123 
Preston Howell 
3386 Ramsey Circle 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84120 
&RTmF 
PARLEYS FATALITY 
An accident on Interstate 80 in Parleys Canyon 
on Friday night claimed the life of 58-year-old 
Gary Egbert of Lay ton. Egbert was driving a 
pickup westbound on 1-80 when he rear-ended a 
semitrailer about 7 p.m., Utah Highway Patrol 
spokeswoman Paula Ernstrom said. Preliminary 
indications suggest excessive speed probably 
played a role in the crash, but the investigation is 
ongoing, Ernstrom said. Egbert was dead at the 
scene and two lanes of the freeway were closed 
for nearly three hours, she said. 
SCAM CONVICTION 
A third man who ran a scam from a now-
defunct classic car dealership in Salt Lake City 
was convicted on six counts of second-degree 
felony communications fraud and racketeering last 
week. Richard A. Nichols faces sentencing July 23 
for the scheme in which he and two others at the 
Remember When car dealership pocketed money 
intended for the cars' sellers and held on to the 
titles that belonged to buyers, prosecutors said. 
Owner John Douglas and operations manager 
Michael Gent earlier pleaded guilty to two 
http //www sltnbune com/05122002/utah/736299 htm 
felonies and testified against Nichols. Twelve cars 
worth nearly $160,000 - including a 1955 Ford 
pickup, a 1966 Corvette and a pair of 1966 Ford 
Mustangs — were part of the scam. 
© Copyright 2002, The Salt Lake Tribune All material found on Utah 
OnLine is copyrighted The Salt Lake Tribune and associated news 
services. No material may be reproduced or reused without explicit 





FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
CIC 1 3 2002 
^JSALT LAKE COUNTY 
Preston S. Howell, #8547 
Attorney for John H Dougla 
3386 Ramsey Circle \ ' Deputy Clerk" 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84120 j N ^ _ i . • y 
Telephone: (801)840-9831 ^ ^ ^ V ^ f r r t t o c D t t f c 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
NOV 1 3 2002 
ALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
DAVID E. NIPPER, 
Individually, and asserting claims 
assigned to him by Jim Ludwig 
and Ruth Ludwig, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN H. DOUGLAS, DOUGLAS 
FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 
JULIE DOUGLAS, JOHN CHASE 
DOUGLAS, TRACY WILSON, MEGAN 
WILSON, CAMERON WILSON, 
WHITNEY WILSON, T-D 
AUTOMOBILE SALES, L.L.C. aka T-D 
ENTERPRISES, L.L.C. dba REMEMBER 
WHEN CLASSIC AND PERFORMANCE 
MOTOR CARS, RICHARD A. NICHOLS, 
MICHAEL D. GENT, CRUZTN' 




Case No. 010904479 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
The above-entitled case came for hearing before this Court in connection with (1) 
Plaintiff s Motion for Reconsideration The hearing was held on November 1, 2002 
before the Honorable Frank G. Noel. The plaintiff was represented by William J. 
Middleton The defendant John H Douglas was represented by Preston S Howell. 
The Court having heard oral argument and having reviewed the file herein, and 
finding good cause therefore, and finding no reason for delay, now makes the following 
order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, because res judicata clearly applies to all 
Plaintiffs' claims against John H. Douglas, Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration is 
denied. Plaintiffs' claims against John H. Douglas are therefore dismissed with 
prejudice. This case is final as to John H. Douglas, and this Court directs Judgment 
entered in favor of Mr. Douglas against Plaintiffs. 
.DATED this £ 2 d a y off^T/- , 2002 
By the Court) 
fionorable Frank G. Noel 
Third District Court Judge 
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